via Delong, Duncan Weldon writes about the IMF Regional Economic Outlook for Europe:
Earlier this week the IMF released its Regional Economic Outlook for Europe.
The press picked up on the fact that it was reiterating its call for some countries (including specifically the UK and Germany) to slow the pace of cuts if growth falters.
They made the same call in the most recent World Economic Outlook and Director Christine Lagarde urged policy makers not to ‘slam on the fiscal brakes’ in an FT article back in July.
Given that this isn’t a new call I thought the chart below was perhaps the most interesting bit of analysis in the report. And something I’ll be returning to in a future blog.

It shows what has driven the increase in public debt between 2007 and 2011 in four selected European countries.
The red segment is fiscal stimulus – what becomes clear is that the UK’s fiscal stimulus (the VAT cut and the bringing forward of investment) was relatively small – especially when compared to ‘austere’ Germany’s much larger direct stimulus.
The yellow segment is support for the financial system – the direct costs of bailing out banks. It’s interesting again to note that Britain’s costs here – although higher than those of France or Italy – are well below German levels.
The grey segment is the ‘interest-growth dynamics’ – the effect of higher interest payments (due to either a bigger stock of debt or higher rates) adjusted for growth. Here we see that the UK and Germany are doing relatively well but Italy is really suffering – it’s these dynamics that are a major driver of market fears about Italy’s debts.
Finally the blue segment is ‘accommodated revenue loss’ –as the IMF explains are ‘revenue losses associated with output losses from the financial crisis’ – which was clearly the driver of the UK’s increase in public debt.
So there we have it – according to the IMF the reason the UK has experienced a large build up in public debt is because of the costs of the large loss of output following the crisis. Not quite the story of public sector profligacy the government is usually so keen to tell.
Financial sector was that large in Germany!? That's considerably larger as a fraction of GDP that what the US did (which is mostly the GSEs and AIG, plus hidden subsidies to the private banking sector via regulatory rules and anti-trust forebearance and montary policy, i.e. things that don't show up in fiscal accounts).
Krugman writes today that
I’ve been playing around with the IMF’s historical public debt database, which has long-term information on ratios of debt to GDP. And you really have to marvel, given that historical record, at the deficit panic now so widespread. Here’s debt as a percentage of GDP in Britain, back to 1830:
That uptick at the end — you’ll see it if you squint — is what’s driving the Cameron government’s insistence on slashing spending in a liquidity trap.
It’s also interesting to note — contrary to what you often hear — that at the time Keynes was writing, and calling for fiscal stimulus, Britain was substantially deeper in debt than Britain or the United States are now.
I note that before 1930 UK government spending was a lot lower than today, with nevertheless a very strong tax base. A strong tax base together with low government spending goes a long way towards supporting a large government debt (and gets you low real interest rates as well, which makes it easier again to have a large debt). One of the concerns now is that spending of the elderly's health care with crowd out servicing public debt.
I should look up the numbers on taxes and spending.
Not quite on point, but still (very) interesting Debt Sustainability in Historical Perspective: The Role of Fiscal Repression by Mauricio Drelichman and Hans-Joachim Voth:
Figure 2 looks at the evolution of Britain’s debts and primary surpluses over the 18th century. Primary surpluses increased in absolute value after every war, but they hardly changed at all relative to GDP. In 1700, Britain had a primary surplus of 7% of GDP; by 1790 it stood at 7.8%. Given the enormous accumulation of debts relative to GDP, rising from 28% to 116%, this is surprising. As shown in Figure 1, there is only a mildly upward-sloping relationship between primary surpluses and debt levels in Britain. The regression implies that, when debt/GDP stood at 20%, the typical surplus was 3.3% of GDP and rose to 3.6% when debt reached 50% of GDP. These values are far below the ones found by the IMF for developed countries today, and at higher levels of indebtedness they are similar to values seen in emerging markets today. ...
At its peak in 1822, the British government had contracted loans equivalent to nearly three times GDP (Barro 1987). Whenever the country fought a war, debt surged. It increased from 50% of GDP after the War of the Spanish Succession to 140% after the Seven Years War and to 275% after the Napoleonic Wars. Yet repay Britain eventually did, while many of the lenders to Philip II saw their claims reduced as part of the reschedulings. However, it took the long Pax Britannica after 1815 to reduce debts to negligible levels. For 64 out of 97 years in our historical sample from the 18th century, the U.K.’s actual debt level was above the sustainable level, often by a factor of 1.3 or more. Investors buying government debt carrying interest rates of 3% stood a chance of being repaid only if the frequency of war declined sharply relative to their historical experience. Only then, with Britain using large peacetime surpluses to pay down its debts, was there a chance of sustainability. Whether investors could have foreseen peace breaking out with a vengeance in the 19th century is highly doubtful. That the Pax Britannica did take hold after 1815 is no proof of ex ante investor rationality. We simply do not know how much luck at Trafalgar and Waterloo was necessary to ensure the eventual triumph of Britain, but few historians would argue that success was a foregone conclusion at any stage. That investors purchased consols may well tell us more about their lack of alternatives than about the inherent attractions of U.K. government paper. ...
We favor an alternative interpretation: financial repression. British fiscal rectitude in the early 1700s is an unlikely explanation for the progressively lower interest rates later in the century. When the U.K. showed the most favorable ratio of primary surpluses to debt, in the early 18th century, its interest rates were not particularly low. In real terms, they were as high as those paid by Philip II. It is only from the 1710s and 1720s onward that British interest rates decline precipitously (Sussman and Yafeh 2006). Since this places the discontinuity a good quarter of a century after the Glorious Revolution, it follows that institutional quality and the restraints imposed by parliamentary rule are also unlikely candidates. Instead of earning a right to lower interest rates, Britain carefully ensured the government’s privileged access to citizens’ savings. Interest rates were heavily regulated. Usury laws reduced the private sector’s competition for funds and created artificially easy borrowing conditions for the government (Temin and Voth 2008). It is no coincidence that government debt service became much cheaper only after 1714, when usury laws were tightened and private lenders were not allowed to charge more than 5% per year Other limitations on private loan contracts, such as restrictions on their maximum duration, worked in the same direction. There is ample evidence that government borrowing crowded out private investment on a large scale. Every time military spending surged, private borrowers were effectively shut out of the loan market (Williamson 1984; Temin and Voth 2005).
Drelichman and Voth also point out the Spain didn't do so well in the 18th century as the UK despite a fiscal policy more responsive to the needs of public creditors since Spains source of borrowing was foreign capital that couldn't be repressed and which could go elsewhere.